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SYMPOSIUM: THE CURT FLOOD ACT

BEFORE THE FLOOD: THE HISTORY OF

BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
ROGER

I.

ABRAMS*

"I want to thank you for making this day necessary"
-Yogi Berra on Yogi Berra Fan
Appreciation Day in St. Louis (1947)
As we celebrate the enactment of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 in this
festschrift, we should not forget the lessons to be learned from the legal
events which made this watershed legislation necessary. Baseball is a
game for the ages, and the Supreme Court's decisions exempting the
baseball business from the nation's antitrust laws are archaic reminders
of judicial decision making at its arthritic worst. However, the opinions
are marvelous teaching tools for inchoate lawyers who will administer
the justice system for many legal seasons to come. The new federal statute does nothing to erase this judicial embarrassment, except, of course,
to overrule a remarkable line of cases: Federal Baseball,' Toolson,2 and
Flood?
I.

STmIKE ONE-IN THE BEGINNING

The historical wellspring of baseball's antitrust exemption was a typical business war among entrepreneurs in the wake of the dismantling of
the Federal League of Baseball after two seasons of play in 1914 and
1915. Federal League owners had created a rival circuit of baseball
clubs, enticing some of the major league's finest talent to jump. Some
stalwarts, such as Ty Cobb, turned down lucrative offeis and, for substantial raises, remained loyal. Eighty-one major leaguers, however, including Mordecai "Three-Finger" Brown, Hal Chase and Joe Tinker, took
the financial bait. The American public had become baseball crazy in
* B.A. Cornell Univ.-1967; J.D. Harvard Univ.-1970. Herbert J. Hannoch Scholar and
Professor of Law Rutgers Law School-Newark.
1. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, et al., 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
3. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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the first decades of the century, and the Feds met this pent-up consumer
demand. When American and National League magnates, as big league
club owners called themselves, brought "reason" to bear on their competition along with millions in cash, the Federal League folded.4
The benefits of the settlement were not evenly distributed among
participants in the Federal League. The established leagues bought out
owners with competing clubs in major league cities. They offered a few
owners the opportunity to purchase interests in existing major league
clubs. Charles Weeglunan of Chicago, for example, bought the Cubs and
moved them into the North Side ballpark he had built for his ChiFeds,
now named Wrigley Field. Phil Ball of the St. Louis Feds, who had first
raised the possibility of a truce, bought the American League Browns.
One owner, Ned Hanlon of the Baltimore Terrapins, felt particularly aggrieved by the settlement. He was offered $50,000.00, but rejected it out
of hand. Hanlon had a long, successful history of involvement in the
game, as a player, manager, and owner, and Baltimore had enjoyed a
glorious tradition of baseball play. It had shared possession of the National League pennant with the Boston Beaneaters throughout the
1890s. Yet, Charles Comiskey, owner of the White Sox could say, "Baltimore is a minor league city and not a hell of a good one at that." 5
The insults, both financial and otherwise, triggered Hanlon's antitrust
suit against Organized Baseball and those owners of the Federal League
who benefitted from the collusive arrangement which resolved the business dispute. At the federal trial court level, Hanlon won $80,000.00
before a jury. There was little doubt the owners had engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade which injured the stockholders of the Baltimore franchise. In accordance with federal antitrust law,
the district judge trebled the damages. On appeal before the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, George Wharton Pepper argued for the established leagues that baseball was sport and not trade; it was "a spontaneous output of human activity ...not in its nature commerce." 6 The
Circuit agreed that baseball "affects no exchange of things."7 Ned Hanlon proceeded up Capitol Hill to the United States Supreme Court.
The FederalBaseball appeal was argued on April 19, 1922, before the
United States Supreme Court, the day preceding Opening Day in the
4. The definitive history of the national pastime remains the multi-volume work of HAR(1960).
5. ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 56 (1998)
6. Id. at 57.
7. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
50 App.D.C. 165, 269 F. 681, 685 (1920).
OLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS & BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE
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District of Columbia, a year in which the Washington Senators finished
sixth, twenty-five games behind the pennant-winning Yankees. Chief
Justice William Howard Taft, a third baseman during his less rotund days
at Yale, reportedly had been approached by major league owners about
the newly-created post of Commissioner of Baseball, obviously a promotion from his current position on the Supreme Court and his prior occupation as President of the United States. Taft declined the opportunity,
but apparently he did not feel it necessary to recuse himself from the
participation in the pending baseball case.
Counsel for the magnates argued before the High Court that "the
very existence of baseball depended upon its exemption from the antitrust laws." 8 After the catastrophe of the Chicago Black Sox scandal, the
Court would not blemish further the National Pastime. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes drew the assignment to write for the unanimous court.
He concluded that the baseball enterprise, albeit a business, did not affect interstate commerce. The major league contests were "purely state
affairs." 9 The travel across state lines that is necessary to produce the
exhibitions was "a mere incident."1 The player's participation was "personal effort, not related to production," and therefore it was "not a subject of commerce.""
If commerce meant only the production of goods, then Holmes might
have had it right under contemporary notions of the limitations of federal power. Yet the following term, again writing for a unanimous court,
Holmes found vaudeville to fall within interstate commerce. 12 The only
distinction between the two cases is that the first involved baseball, the
but not a distinction of
second did not. This, of course, is a difference,
3
relevance in the analysis of the statutes.1
II.

STRiKE Two-BOUND BY PRECEDENT

Thirty years later, the Court had the opportunity to rethink baseball's
antitrust exemption. Toolson v. New York Yankees involved a minor
8. ABRAMs, supra note 5, at 57.
9. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. 200, 208.
10. Id. at 209.
11. Id. 208-209.
12. Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923).
13. Holmes' decision in FederalBaseball has been subjected to ridicule for decades. See,
e.g., Robert C. Berry & William Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining:Of Players, Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CASE WEST. RES. L. REv. 685, 729-30 (1981). Judge
Henry Friendly commented in Salerno v. American League, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2 Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, sub nom. Salerno v. Kuhn, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971), "[w]e freely acknowledge our
belief that, FederalBaseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days ......
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league ballplayer with the Newark Bears, the Yankees' AAA farm team,
who sued under the antitrust laws to resist assignment to another club
and to escape baseball's ironclad personnel system. The lower courts did
not reach the merits of his claim, dismissing the suit on the basis of Federal Baseball. The Supreme Court, in a one paragraph per curiam, reaffirmed its Federal Baseball precedent, although antitrust cases in the
interim had made Holmes' analysis obsolete. The Court wrote, "[t]he
business [of baseball] has ...been left for thirty years to develop, on the

understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation."14
Evidently, the magnates had a reliance interest in being allowed to engaged in otherwise unlawful conduct.
In addition to its formalistic invocation of stare decisis, the Toolson
case is interesting because of the interplay surrounding the decision between the judicial and legislative branches of government. Before the
case was argued in the Supreme Court, a House subcommittee chaired
by Congressman Emanuel Cellars of New York, conducted a hearing on
the baseball industry, focusing on the need for the reserve system and
the impact of the antitrust exemption. In addition to a singular performance by witness Casey Stengel, those hearings are notable for the assertion by counsel for the major leagues that Congress need not disturb
Federal Baseball because the exemption issue would be heard by the
Supreme Court the next term in the Toolson case. That tribunal, the
Subcommittee was assured, will surely correct any error it might have
committed. Based on this warrant, Congress agreed it would do nothing.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the major
leagues became a switch hitter. He argued for the major leagues that the
Court should not disturb its long-standing precedent because Congress
had had the opportunity to clarify its legislative intentions as a result of
its 1952 investigation, and it had chosen not to act. Counsel's duplicitous
assertion apparently did not disturb the Court, assuming it even knew of
the chicanery.
III.

STRIKE THREE-A JUDICIAL EMBARRASSMENT

The story of Curt Flood's valiant struggle for personal dignity and
freedom in defending his right to play baseball is worth retelling. A stel-

lar center fielder whose flawless play led the Cardinals to three pennants
in the 1960s, Flood was a respected figure on his club and in his community. His letter to Bowie Kuhn rejecting his involuntary reassignment to
14. Toolson, 346 U.S. 356, 356.
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Philadelphia from his adopted hometown of St. Louis remains a classic
document of the civil rights struggle. More than money was at stake. He
wrote, "[a]fter 12 years in the Major Leagues, I do not feel I am a piece
of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. I believe
that any system which produces that result violates my basic rights as a
citizen."'"
Flood filed suit against the Commissioner of Baseball, the presidents
of the two major leagues and the twenty-four major league clubs, claiming violations of both the federal and state antitrust laws and civil rights
statutes. The lower federal courts dismissed the antitrust claim based on
the FederalBaseball and Toolson precedents. With the financial support
of the Major League Baseball Players Association and the representation of former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, Flood offered
the Supreme Court the opportunity to right its wrong. The Court declined the invitation.
The case came to Justice Harry Blackmun to write for the majority.
Blackmun was in his sophomore year on the Supreme Court, and,
although he would later develop into one of our nation's great jurists, his
opinion in Flood is quite bewildering. His opinion reaffirmed the 50year-old holding of FederalBaseball as an "established aberration" without justification under modem antitrust and interstate commerce jurisprudence: "It rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's
unique characteristics and needs."' 6 Justice Blackmun did not suggest
what these might be.
Blackmun's work product is an embarrassing display of sentimentality combined with rigid adherence to notions of stare decisis. Baseball
was just different, according to Blackmun. It would remain so for as
long as Congress maintained its "positive inaction," a curious construct
for judicial interpretation of legislative inertia in the face of a hoard of
lobbyists.
The majority opinion in Flood v. Kuhn opens with a song of praise
for our National Game. Blackmun lists his favorite all-time players. In
THE BRETHREN, Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong report that Justice Marshall complained to Blackmun that his list contained no players
of color.' 7 Blackmun responded that his roster only included major
league players who preceded the reintegration of the sport. Marshall
15. ABRAMs, supra note 5, at 65.
16. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
17. BOB WOODWARD & ScOrT ARMSTRONG, Tim
CoURT 191 (1979).

BREmREN: INSmDE THE SuPREmE
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retorted that this was his point exactly. Blackmun's beloved sport had
systematically excluded from its potential players splendid athletes from
ten percent of the population, such as Josh Gibson and Buck Leonard.
Twenty-five years early, Curt Flood would not have been allowed to play
in the major leagues. Blackmun added Jackie Robinson, Satchel Paige
and Roy Campanella, to his list, but Marshall was preparing to dissent in
any case combining the legal acuity and moral outrage at injustice which
characterized his tenure on the Court.
Blackmun's opinion states flatly that the holding in FederalBaseball
was wrong. Yet, because the wrong had lasted so long, he concluded that
it was a wrong the Court, which gave it birth, could not right. If correction were to come, it would be for Congress to accomplish. Congress
was no more willing to overturn Federal Baseball in 1972 then it had
been for the prior half century. It would take another twenty-six years
before it enacted the Curt Flood Act.
IV.

A LONG, DEEP DRIVE

AND BASEBALL COMES

HOME

If baseball was to end its wanderings through this legal desert, it

would take the concerted effort and economic strength of the players to
locate the promised land. For a century, the players had been bound by
the shackles of the reserve system, and neither the courts nor the legislature were about to set them free. In the late 1960s, under Marvin
Miller's determined leadership, the players transformed their fraternal

organization into a real trade union. Over the next decades under
Miller's stewardship and the equally able direction of his successor, Don-

ald Fehr, the players effectively instituted by contract a private regime
prohibiting the same collusive conduct by the owners that would have
been proscribed by the antitrust laws had those laws applied to the baseball enterprise. The collective bargaining agreement even provided for
treble damages awarded in arbitration for the violation of the no-collusion promise. Yet FederalBaseballremained a potent symbol of baseball
management's supremacy in the forums of public policy.
At the final stage of the protracted negotiations leading to the resolution of the 1994-1995 labor dispute, the Player Association sought a
promise from the owners to join the union in securing Congressional
action to overturn the antitrust exemption in so far as it affected players
at the major league level. Management's able bargaining representative,
Randy Levine, agreed. The proposed repeal of the exemption would not
change one iota of the relationship between the major league club owners and the major league players, but it would be an important symbol.
Article XXVIII of the current collective bargaining agreement provided:
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The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate
in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major
League Baseball Players are covered by the antitrust laws ( i.e.,
that Major League Players will have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and
basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that
the passage of that bill does not change the application of the
antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any other
person or entity. If such law is not enacted by December 31, 1998
(the end of the next Congress), than this Agreement shall terminate by December 31, 2000 (unless the Association exercises its
option 8to extend this Agreement as set forth in Article YXVII).'
In the fall of 1998, Congress acted upon the joint request of the club
owners and the players association. The statute leaves open many significant issues of the applicability of the antitrust exemption in other areas,
issues explored elsewhere in this symposium. The Curt Flood Act of
1998 brought baseball home again, back into the mainstream of American law. It ends a disgraceful chapter in American jurisprudence, which,
to paraphrase Yogi, made this statute necessary.
Baseball was unassailable in court and in Congress, even when its
actions conflicted with reason, law and principle. The disturbing saga
told by the cases before the Flood Act demonstrate that sometimes the
judiciary is no better at righting wrongheaded decisions than a .200 hitter
is at hitting a nasty slider.

18.

BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE Am

cAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL

CLUBS AND TmE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, Article XXVII "Antitrust," at 107 (effective Jan-

uary 1, 1997).

